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Abstract
User interfaces form a critical juncture between humans
and computers. When the interface fails, the user fails, and
the mission is lost. For example, in computer security appli-
cations, human-made configuration errors can expose en-
tire systems to various forms of attack.
To avoid interaction failures, a dependable user inter-
face must facilitate user-task completion as quickly and as
accurately as possible. Defects in the interface cause user
errors (e.g., goal, plan, action and perception errors), that
impinge on accuracy goals, and can lead to mission failure.
This paper explores the causes of goal errors, asking
what aspects of a user interface contribute to or detract
from a user’s propensity to commit goal errors. A de-
sign principle (anchor-based subgoaling) was formulated
for avoiding goal errors. Implementing this principle re-
quires presenting the user with a salient representation, or
anchor, of the goal state, and providing a framework to fa-
cilitate a user’s creation and pursuit of subgoals to com-
plete a task. Two interfaces for setting user file permissions
were tested: Windows XP and an alternative. The alterna-
tive supported anchor-based subgoaling, and Windows did
not. Experiments with 24 human subjects demonstrated the
increased effectiveness of the alternative interface, obtain-
ing as much as a four-fold increase in accuracy in a repre-
sentative user task, and a 94% reduction in the number of
goal-error occurrences.
1. Introduction
One locus of vulnerability in a computer system is the
user interface. Undependable interfaces are those that do
not meet their specification in terms of the speed and ac-
curacy with which users should complete tasks. One rea-
son why some user interfaces fail to meet their speed and
accuracy specifications is human error. Researchers have
long recognized that human error has causes and manifes-
tations similar across all domains of human endeavor, from
aviation, to power plant operation, to making a cup of tea
[23, 16, 18, 14]. In the domain of software user interfaces,
human error leads people off the path of correctly complet-
ing a task and on to lengthy delays or total task failure.
Thus, it is imperative for interface designers to understand
the common types and causes of human error and the ways
in which they may be prevented. When interfaces are de-
signed to eliminate the conditions that lead humans to make
mistakes, interfaces will be more dependable.
One domain in which user interface accuracy is critically
important is computer security. Inaccurate security settings
can have a high cost - they can make sensitive data vul-
nerable, or they can leave an entire system open to attack.
Adding to this cost, security problems have what Whitten
and Tygar [21] have called the “barn door property” - once
a system has had a vulnerability for any length of time,
there may be no way to know if the vulnerability has been
exploited or not, so the system will have to be considered
compromised, whether it has been or not.
The present work investigates user interface dependabil-
ity and human error in the security context of setting file
permissions under Microsoft’s Windows XP operating sys-
tem, which uses Microsoft’s NT file system (NTFS). A sig-
nificant amount of anecdotal evidence suggests that setting
NTFS file permissions is a particularly error-prone task for
which the consequences of failure can be severe. For ex-
ample, there is the so-called “Memogate” scandal, in which
Republican staffers on the United States Senate Judiciary
Committee stole confidential memos from the opposing
Democratic party [20]. The memos were stored on a shared
NTFS server. The theft was possible in part because an in-
experienced system administrator had failed to set permis-
sions correctly on the shared server. As another example,
a Windows network administrator at Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity reports that many users who want to share their files
so they can access them both at work and at home make
their private files accessible to all (several hundred) users on
the network, because it is too confusing to set permissions
as desired [19]. Finally, Microsoft publishes a list of “best
practices” for NTFS security that advises users not to use
several of the features of the NTFS permissions model, such
as negative (i.e., Deny) permissions and the ability to set
permissions on individual files as opposed to folders [12].
Providing access to features which are not supposed to be
used is bound to lead to errors.
As these anecdotes indicate, setting and checking per-
missions cannot always be left to expert system adminis-
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trators - users in many environments need or want to take
responsibility for protecting their own data. Nevertheless,
setting file permissions is not an everyday task - it may need
to be done only every few weeks or months. Thus, those set-
ting file permissions will often not be expert system admin-
istrators - they will be novice or occasional users, who, from
time to time, want to restrict access to some data or grant
access to data to a limited number of associates. They will
not readily remember arcane details about how to operate a
file-permissions-setting interface. The present work adopts
the underlying assumption that file-permissions-setting in-
terfaces should accommodate novice and occasional users.
This paper reports results of an investigation into and a
solution for one type of human error encountered in file-
permissions setting interfaces. First, an existing interface
for setting NTFS permissions, the Windows XP File Per-
missions interface (hereafter abbreviated XPFP), was eval-
uated in a laboratory user study and shown to have accuracy
rates as low as 25% on file-permissions-setting tasks. Errors
made by users in the XPFP interface were identified and cat-
egorized into types according to an established human-error
framework. Goal errors, the failures of users to understand
what to do, were identified as the dominant type of error. A
primary cause of goal errors, namely lack of an “anchor”, or
a representation of the completion status of the user’s root
goal, was identified. A design principle, anchor-based sub-
goaling, was proposed to reduce goal errors and was imple-
mented in a new interface, called Salmon, for setting NTFS
file permissions. The design principle was evaluated in a
laboratory user study identical in design to the XPFP study
but employing the new interface. Salmon achieved a suc-
cess rate of 100% on the task on which XPFP had achieved
a 25% accuracy rate, and showed a 94% reduction in the
number of goal errors users made on the same task.
2 Problem and approach
The objective of the present work is to understand the na-
ture of user error in user interfaces generally, and XPFP in
particular, and to determine what can be done to reduce or
eliminate it. It is a further objective to find a design princi-
ple that can be applied to new generations of user interfaces
so that the same user errors are not encountered again and
again and again in future user interfaces.
To investigate error in the XPFP interface, a laboratory
user study was conducted with 12 participants each per-
forming 7 file-permissions-setting tasks using XPFP. Data
collected from the participants’ sessions included their ac-
tual permissions settings, verbal protocol, screen video, and
mouse and keyboard activity from an instrumented worksta-
tion. This data was analyzed first to simply determine how
many participants successfully completed the tasks. Then
data was analyzed in more detail to determine occurrences
of error. Finally, each occurrence of error was classified as
one of the four error types - goal, plan, action, or perception
- proposed in Pocock et al [15]. Goal errors were the most
frequently encountered type of error in the XPFP study.
A solution was proposed to reduce the occurrence of goal
errors. This solution, called anchor-based subgoaling (see
section 3), led to this paper’s hypothesis:
Use of anchor-based subgoaling in user interface
design reduces the likelihood that users will com-
mit goal errors, and task accuracy rates should im-
prove when goal errors are reduced.
This hypothesis was tested by implementing an interface,
Salmon, in accordance with the anchor-based subgoaling
principle, and conducting a laboratory user study identical
in design to the XPFP study but using Salmon instead. Task
success rates and goal error occurrences were compared be-
tween the XPFP and Salmon studies to determine whether
anchor-based subgoaling as implemented in Salmon was an
effective means of improving success and reducing goal er-
rors.
3 Anchor-based subgoaling
The present work relies on Pocock et al.’s [15] Technique
for Human Error Assessment (THEA) to classify human er-
ror into types. THEA was developed to analyze a user in-
terface design for areas of potential user difficulty without
conducting costly user studies. It includes an error frame-
work which is based on Norman’s well-known seven-stage
execution-evaluation model of human information process-
ing [14]. THEA condenses Norman’s seven stages down
to four stages of information processing during which hu-
man error can occur. These four stages are the combination
of perception, interpretation, and evaluation; goal formula-
tion; plan formulation; and action execution. According to
the Norman/THEA models, human information processing
starts with a problem, the root goal, and proceeds in the fol-
lowing loop:
1. Perceive and interpret information from the environ-
ment, and evaluate whether the problem is solved;
2. If the problem remains unsolved, formulate a subgoal,
according to perceived information, for solving all or
part of the problem; if the problem is solved, exit the
loop;
3. Formulate a plan to achieve the subgoal;
4. Execute the actions in the plan;
5. Loop in this manner until the problem is solved.
Goal errors occur when the second step goes wrong. If the
perceived information consulted in the second step is incor-
rect or is misinterpreted, the wrong subgoal may be set. If
the wrong information is used to check whether the problem
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has been solved in the second step, either an unnecessary
subgoal may be added, if the problem is assumed unsolved
when it is already solved, or a necessary subgoal may be
omitted, if the problem is assumed solved when it is not.
Thus the availability of information to check progress to-
ward the root goal is critical to correct subgoal selection. If
the salient information points to an inappropriate rule or no
rule, goal errors are likely to result.
If it is incorrect, misleading, or missing information that
causes goal errors, the logical solution is to make the nec-
essary information available in a correct, easily interpreted
form. In particular, information showing the user the cur-
rent system status relative to the user’s real-world goals is
critical. Anchor-based subgoaling is a design principle that
embodies this solution. A user interface designed in accor-
dance with the anchor-based subgoaling principle should
have a representation, an “anchor”, of the status of goal
completion. This anchor should serve to allow users to
check progress and set new subgoals as needed. Further-
more, this representation should have the following charac-
teristics:
1. Accuracy - it will be correctly reflect goal completion
status;
2. Clarity - it will be easily and reliably interpreted cor-
rectly;
3. Completeness - it will contain all the information the
user needs to check progress;
4. Visibility - it will not be hidden;
5. Salience - users will notice it;
6. Persistence - it will be available throughout the user’s
progression through tasks;
7. Accessibility - if it cannot all fit in the user’s view, parts
that are out-of-view can easily be brought into view;
8. Currency - it will be accurately updated as the user
makes changes.
As described in section 5 below, file permissions setting
can be a difficult task because the low-level permission bits
a user operates on do not necessarily translate directly into
what access will be allowed to system data. Actual access
in NTFS is determined by a nuanced formula computed by
the operating system on each attempted access. However,
users setting file permissions are ultimately concerned with
who can access what, not with low-level bits and nuanced
formulas. Thus the necessary information for users to eval-
uate goal status is the effective permissions, which are the
output of the nuanced formula, and reflect the actual access
that will be granted to system data. A file-permissions inter-
face designed in accordance with anchor-based subgoaling
should have an accurate, clear, complete, visible, salient,
persistent, and current display of effective permissions.
Figure 1: A screenshot of the XPFP interface. The interface
contains information and functionality for setting permis-
sions bits, but effective permissions are not visible.
Casual observation of the XPFP interface (see Figure 1)
reveals that XPFP lacks an anchor display. The XPFP main
window contains the checkboxes necessary for setting the
permissions bits that will be used to determine effective per-
missions, but effective permissions themselves are nowhere
to be seen. In fact, XPFP can display effective permissions,
but they are two screens away. To see them, users must
hit the Advanced button, then select an “Effective Permis-
sions” tab. Even then, users must go through an extra step to
choose whose effective permissions they want to see; view-
ing multiple sets of effective permissions simultaneously
is impossible. When users return to changing permissions
bits, the effective permissions display disappears.
The Salmon interface (see Figure 2) was designed in ac-
cordance with anchor-based subgoaling. The Salmon main
window contains two panes. In the upper pane are the
checkboxes necessary for setting permissions bits. In the
lower pane is an effective permissions display. The effec-
tive permissions display is available at all times. When
changes are made in the upper pane, they are reflected in
the lower pane, and attention is drawn to the lower pane
by highlighting the areas that have changed. While not all
effective permissions can be viewed on screen at the same
time, Salmon’s lower pane can be scrolled to access infor-
mation that does not fit on the screen. Salmon’s effective
permissions display is an embodiment of the anchor-based
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Figure 2: A screenshot of the Salmon interface. The upper
pane of the Salmon interface contains the same informa-
tion and functionality in the XPFP main window. The lower
pane of the Salmon interface contains an effective permis-
sions display - the cornerstone of this implementation of
anchor-based subgoaling.
subgoaling principle.
4 Related work
Other authors have proposed design principles similar to
anchor-based subgoaling and have implemented interfaces
similar to Salmon. Related work falls into three areas. The
first is prior work on usable file permissions, usable access
control, and other configuration interfaces. The second, a
superset of the first, is work in the emerging field of human-
computer interaction and security, also known as HCISEC.
The third is the traditional literature on human-computer in-
teraction and interface design.
File permissions are an instance of the broader area of
access control in which several authors have published re-
lated work. Those who have evaluated interfaces for setting
file access include Zurko et al. [25], Good and Krekelberg
[7], and Long et al. [10]. Zurko et al. conducted a user study
on the Visual Policy Builder, a graphical user interface for
specifying access control policies for their Adage system.
Good and Krekelberg showed that the Kazaa peer-to-peer
file-sharing service’s interface misled many users into unin-
tentionally sharing confidential files. Long et al. evaluated a
preliminary, paper-based interface for limiting applications’
access to system resources. While these three interface eval-
uations were interesting in their specific task domains, none
appear to lead to any conclusion about design principles for
security interfaces in a larger context.
Other work in usable access control in various domains
includes Balfanz [2], Sampemane et al. [17], and Dewan
and Shen [5]. With the exception of the Adage project and
Long et al., work in this area involves outlining access con-
trol models, not evaluating access control interfaces, as the
present work sets out to do.
File-permissions-setting and access control interfaces
may be classed in the broader category of configuration in-
terfaces. Configuration interfaces, which are interfaces de-
signed for specifying system, application, or communica-
tion settings, and which share the common lack-of-expertise
problems associated with novice or occasional users, have
received attention from authors in both security and privacy.
Zurko et al. [25] and Good and Krekelberg [7], also cited
above, are examples of works that have addressed config-
uration interfaces in security applications, while Cranor et
al. [4] and Lederer et al. [9] have addressed configuration
interfaces in the privacy domain. Cranor et al. conducted a
detailed empirical evaluation of a configuration interface for
setting privacy preferences, but their user study was mainly
focused on validating a specific organization and vocabu-
lary for privacy concepts, rather than on validating a general
interface design principle. Lederer et al. discuss useful de-
sign pitfalls to avoid, but do not validate them empirically.
In the broader human-computer interaction and security
literature, those who have acknowledged the challenges of
designing dependable user interfaces in security-related do-
mains and have proposed principles for better security in-
terface design include Whitten and Tygar [21], Adams and
Sasse [1], Besnard and Arief [3], Zurko and Simon [26],
and Yee [24]. Such papers propose ideas for making secu-
rity tasks easier to perform accurately, but do not evaluate
their ideas empirically. Whitten and Tygar, in another paper
[22], present user study results to validate a design principle
for security interfaces, but their principle, “safe staging”, is
not related to anchor-based subgoaling, nor is it grounded
in any theory of human error.
The most closely related concept in the traditional
human-computer interaction literature to anchor-based sub-
goaling is the concept of feedback. Norman defines feed-
back as “sending back to the user information about what
action has actually been done, what result has been accom-
plished [14].” Norman and Nielsen both include feedback
as an important user interface design principle [13, 14].
Anchor-based subgoaling includes feedback from user ac-
tions that affect goal status, but also includes presenting
goal status to the user before any action has been taken and
making the goal-status display constantly visible as the user
completes the task.
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5 The NTFS file permissions model
Some background on the NTFS file permissions model
is necessary to fully understand the XPFP and Salmon in-
terfaces and the study design used to evaluate them. File
permissions in NTFS are quite complex - in the interest of
clarity, some portions of the NTFS file permissions model
have been simplified or omitted in the material presented
below.
A computer system using NTFS will be populated with
entities and objects. The entities are individual users and
groups of users on the system. The objects are the files
and folders on the system. NTFS defines 13 atomic permis-
sions1 that correspond to actions that users can perform on
files and folders.
The precise meanings of the 13 NTFS atomic permis-
sions are not relevant to this paper, but are described in [11].
For purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to note that NTFS
permissions can be grouped into five disjoint sets: Read,
Write, Execute, Delete, and Administrate2.
NTFS uses an Access Control List (ACL) model of file
permissions. Under the ACL model, each file and folder
in the file system has an associated list of users and groups
who have permissions on that file or folder. An entry in
this list is called an access control entry. The access control
entry for each user or group on the list has a setting for
each of the atomic permissions. This setting’s value may be
Allow, Deny, or Unset. The meaning of Allow and Deny
are self-evident; the Unset setting functions as a Deny by
default, but can be overridden by a competing Allow setting,
as described below.
If a group has permissions on an object, all the mem-
ber users of the group inherit the group’s permissions for
the object. This group inheritance leads to the question of
precedence: suppose a user has an Allow Read setting for
a file, but is a member of a group with a Deny Read set-
ting for the same file - will that user be allowed to read the
file or not? NTFS defines precedence rules to address this
quandary. Specifically, Deny settings take precedence over
Allow settings, but Allow settings take precedence over Un-
set settings. So if a user has an Allow Read setting for a file,
but inherits a Deny Read setting for that file, the system user
will be denied access to read the file. Group inheritance and
precedence rules lead to the distinction between stated per-
missions, the permissions contained in a user’s access con-
trol entry, and effective permissions, the actual access a user
will be allowed.
1Note that NTFS documentation uses the term special permission
where atomic permission is used here. The latter term makes it clearer
that these are the lowest-level, indivisible permissions in the system.
2Note that the XPFP interface and NTFS documentation use a different,
non-disjoint grouping of the 13 atomic permissions into six composite sets.
The disjoint grouping discussed here is the authors’ own, and is used for
clarity of presentation to those readers not already familiar with the NTFS
permissions model.
Of the five sets of atomic permissions mentioned above,
only Read, Write, and Administrate will figure into the tasks
for the present study. Administrate permission deserves one
special note - an entity that is allowed Administrate permis-
sion can change its own permissions, so even if it were de-
nied Read or Write permission on an object, it would still
be able to read or write the object by allowing itself that
permission.
6 Methodology
Two laboratory user studies were conducted to observe
and document errors in file-permissions-setting tasks. In the
first study, 12 participants used the XPFP interface. In the
second study, 12 participants used Salmon, the new, alterna-
tive interface developed to set NTFS file permissions. Oth-
erwise, both studies were identical. Each participant was
asked to perform 7 file-permissions-setting tasks with the
interface they were assigned. Each task completed is re-
ferred to as a task instance; since there were 7 tasks and 12
participants per interface, 84 task instances were completed
per interface.
6.1 Data collection methodology
6.1.1 Participants
Twenty-four students and research staff at Carnegie Mellon
University voluntarily participated in the study. All partici-
pants’ academic backgrounds were in science and engineer-
ing disciplines. All participants were daily computer users.
While a few usually used UNIX-based computer systems
in their daily work, all had at least some experience using
Windows, with 21 out of 24 claiming they used Windows
at least a few times a week. Nineteen reported having some
experience setting file permissions, on Windows or another
operating system, while 5 reported having no experience
setting file permissions whatsoever. All but four reported
setting file permissions a few times a month or less. Thus,
the participant pool was consistent with the assumption of
novice and occasional users.
6.1.2 Apparatus
All participants worked on the same computer, a system
running Windows XP, Version 2002, Service Pack 1. Us-
ing a standard think-aloud experimental paradigm [6], we
asked participants to think aloud as they worked, while we
recorded their voice. Screen video and mouse and keyboard
actions were recorded with a software tool developed for
user study data collection. Participants’ final permissions
settings were also saved after each task instance.
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6.1.3 Task design
Tasks were based on situations one might normally en-
counter in a work or academic setting. While sampling
the space of all file-permissions-setting tasks broadly and
evenly was not attempted, the task contexts created would
come up in real-world situations.
To simulate real permissions-settings conditions in the
laboratory, a hypothetical scenario was designed in which
the participant worked in a generic “organization”, shared
her computer with other workers in the organization, and
had to restrict access to the files and folders on her com-
puter. On our laboratory Windows XP machine, we created
the hypothetical organization’s computer environment, pop-
ulated with individual users, groups containing users, files,
and folders. The environment included 27 individual users,
named for each letter of the alphabet (ari, bill, catherine,
dave, evelyn, etc.) plus one user named ’tux’, which was
to represent the participant. The environment also included
6 groups named ProjectA through ProjectF, each of which
contained 6 members drawn from the 27 users. No group
contained another group as a member. There were 7 files
and folders on which participants were to set permissions,
one for each task.
The first of the tasks was a simple training task to give
participants a quick introduction to the interface they were
using. All participants performed this task first, and it was
excluded from analysis. The remaining 6 tasks consisted
of a variety of existing-permissions contexts. Two of those
tasks, called the Wesley and Jack tasks, are discussed here.
These tasks were chosen because they involved group in-
heritance, a feature of the NTFS permissions model that
seemed to lead to a great deal of user error. A third task that
also exercised group inheritance was excluded from anal-
ysis because its requirements were ill-specified, and were
unclear to some participants.
The Wesley and Jack tasks both required participants to
set permissions on a text file so that the entities “Wesley”
or “Jack” could read the file, but not change it. The task
statement presented to the user for each task was identical
except for the names of specific files, users, and groups.
The task statement for the Wesley task read as follows (with
differences for the Jack task statement in brackets):
The group ProjectF [ProjectE] is working on pro-
jectFdata.txt [projectEdata.txt], so everyone in
ProjectF [ProjectE] can read, write, or delete
it. Wesley [Jack] (username: wesley [jack]) has
just been reassigned to another project and must
not be allowed to change the file’s contents, but
should be allowed to read it. Make sure that effec-
tive now, Wesley [Jack] can read the file projectF-
data.txt [projectEdata.txt], but in no way change
its contents.
In both tasks, there was one group (ProjectF or ProjectE,
for the Wesley and Jack tasks, respectively) that was already
on the access control list (ACL) for the file, and the opera-
tive individual user (Wesley or Jack) was a member of that
group. The difference between the two tasks was that in
the Wesley task, Wesley is inheriting allow Read and Write
permissions from ProjectF but not Administrate permission,
while in the Jack task, Jack is inheriting allow Read and
Write as well as Administrate permissions from ProjectE.
The simple solution to the Wesley task is to add Wesley
to the ACL and explicitly deny him Write permission; he is
already allowed Read permission from ProjectF. However,
this simple solution does not work for Jack, since Jack is in-
heriting Administrate permission as well as Read and Write
permission. If Jack is denied Write permission, but not ex-
plicitly denied Administrate permission, he will be able to
restore his Write permission. The task statement presented
to users did not mention this nuance; it was left to the inter-
faces to provide the cues needed to understand that Jack’s
Administrate permission had to be removed.
6.1.4 Rules for completing tasks
To help even out the difference between participants who
were already familiar with the NTFS file permissions model
and those who were not, participants were allowed to con-
sult documentation, in the form of online Windows Help
files. Participants assigned to Salmon were allowed to con-
sult two Help files that explained the NTFS file permissions
model, including group inheritance, precedence rules, and
atomic permission descriptions. Participants assigned to
XPFP were allowed to consult the same two Help files, plus
three additional Help files which gave the procedures for as-
signing permissions in XPFP. Since no documentation ex-
ists yet for Salmon, participants using Salmon did not have
the benefit of procedural documentation (which did not ap-
pear to hurt their performance).
Since group memberships were an important piece of
knowledge for completing the tasks, participants were al-
lowed to look up group memberships in a standard interface
that Windows XP provides for this purpose, the XP Com-
puter Management interface. However, participants were
instructed not to change group memberships; hence they
could not remove inherited permissions by simply remov-
ing Wesley or Jack from the group from which permissions
were inherited. This constraint served to limit participants
to using the file permissions interfaces to make changes,
and prevented use of the XP Computer Management inter-
face, which was not relevant to this study’s evaluation, for
any purpose besides viewing group memberships. Further-
more, this constraint simulated an environment, consistent
with the assumption of novice or occasional users, in which
individual users may set permissions on their files, but only
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system administrators may change group memberships. Al-
though participants were instructed not to change group
memberships, they were told that if a task statement did
not explicitly mention an entity, any permission setting was
permissible for that entity. Thus, participants could change
ProjectE’s or ProjectF’s permissions and not be concerned
about the effects on members of those groups besides Wes-
ley or Jack.
6.1.5 Procedure
Participants were instructed in thinking aloud according to
directions adapted from Ericsson and Simon [6]. Follow-
ing think-aloud instruction, participants were shown how to
view system users, groups, and group memberships using
the XP Computer Management interface. Then participants
were shown how to access the Help files that they were al-
lowed to consult as they were performing tasks. They were
instructed not to consult any other Help files. Participants
were not given any instruction in using the XPFP or Salmon
interfaces.
Following instruction on the XP Computer Management
interface and the Help files, participants were given the
tasks. Before each task, the experimenter brought up the
interface the participant was to use to set permissions. Then
task statements were presented in text in a Web browser, and
remained available to the participant throughout the task.
All participants were given the training task first, but after
that, presentation order of the remaining tasks was counter-
balanced among participants using a Latin square design.
Participants were told they had 8 minutes to complete each
task, but no one exceeded this limit on any task. The exper-
imenter only stepped in occasionally to remind participants
to keep talking for the think-aloud protocol, and to remind
participants of the general rules for completing the experi-
ment when participants were confused about them.
6.2 Data analysis methodology
Data analysis consisted of the following five steps:
1. For each of the two tasks, Wesley and Jack, apply a
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA: see section 6.2.1) to
determine the steps necessary to complete the task;
2. For each task instance, determine whether the user suc-
ceeded or failed at completing the task;
3. For each task instance, list all actions taken by the user;
4. For each action taken, classify it as an error or a non-
error by comparing it to the steps listed in the HTAs;
5. For each error, classify it as one of four types of error
- goal, plan, action, or perception.
6.2.1 Step 1: Hierarchical Task Analysis
To aid in the identification of errors, a Hierarchical Task
Analysis (HTA) was applied to the Wesley and Jack tasks.
HTA, as described by Kirwan [8] is a tool for breaking a
task down into its components - the goals, plans, and actions
required to complete the task. An HTA diagram for the Jack
task is shown in Figure 3. As the figure shows, each task has
a root goal that is decomposed into subgoals, which are in
turn decomposed into actions. Plans express constraints on
the choice or ordering of actions.
Goal:  Jack should be allowed to read but not change the file
Subgoal 1:  Allow jack 
effective read permission
Subgoal 2: Override or 
eliminate ProjectE's
Allow write permission
Subgoal 3:  Override or 
eliminate ProjectE's Allow 
administrate permission
1.1 Add 
jack
2.2 Deny 
jack write
3.2 Deny jack 
administrate
1.2 Allow 
jack read
2.4 Remove 
ProjectE
2.3 Unset or Deny 
ProjectE’s write 
permission
3.3 Deny (or leave unset) 
ProjectE’s administrate 
permission
1.3 Let jack inherit 
read permission from 
ProjectE
2.1 Add 
jack
3.4 Remove 
ProjectE
3.1 Add 
jack
PLAN: 1.1-1.2 
in order OR 1.3
PLAN: 2.1-2.2 in 
order OR 2.3 OR 2.4
PLAN: Any order
PLAN: 3.1-3.2 in 
order OR 3.3 OR 3.4
Figure 3: Hierarchical Task Analysis diagram of the Jack
task.
6.2.2 Step 2: Determining task success or failure
To determine task instance successes and failures, partici-
pants’ final permission settings were examined. A task in-
stance was ruled successful if the operative individual (Wes-
ley or Jack) had effective permissions allowing him Read
permission and denying him Write and Administrate per-
missions. A task instance was ruled a failure if the op-
erative individual had effective permissions denying Read
permission, or allowing Write and/or Administrate permis-
sion. Execute and Delete permissions and all permissions
for other entities were ignored.
6.2.3 Step 3: Listing actions
Actions were defined for the purpose of breaking user pro-
tocol data into discrete units for error analysis. An action
was defined as any change to the ACL, namely adding an
entity to or removing an entity from the ACL, or altering
the permissions of an entity already on the ACL.
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6.2.4 Step 4: Classifying actions as errors
Once actions for each task instance were listed, they were
compared to the actions listed in the HTA for the corre-
sponding task (Wesley or Jack). Each discrepancy between
user actions and actions in the HTA was classified as an
error of commission, an error of omission, or a non-error.
A user action was an error of commission if it was unnec-
essary according to the HTA and could potentially lead to
failure. A user action was an error of omission if it was a
necessary action according to the HTA but the user failed to
complete it. Non-errors included user actions that matched
actions in the HTA and unnecessary but innocuous actions,
such as changing permissions in an interface to “see what
happens” and then changing them back.
6.2.5 Step 5: Classifying errors by THEA type
Pocock et al.’s [15] THEA proposes four stages of human
information processing that map directly to the four error
types used to categorize errors in this work: goal, plan, ac-
tion, and perception errors. Because error classification was
not their main objective, Pocock et al. are not perfectly clear
about the criteria for classifying a specific error as one of the
four THEA types. However, all attempts were made to en-
sure that the error classification criteria used for this work
are faithful to Pocock et al.’s descriptions of the four types.
Since goal errors are the focus of this paper, the criteria used
to classify errors as goal errors is described below. Similar
criteria were used for classifying errors as action, plan, and
perception errors.
The data used to classify errors into types included ver-
bal protocol, screen video, and mouse and keyboard logs.
An error was classified as a goal error if it was either:
• An error of commission that was judged to be due to
the user’s establishing a wrong subgoal; or
• An error of omission that was judged to be due to the
user’s failure to establish a necessary subgoal.
An example of a common goal error from the Wesley task
was a user failing to explicitly deny Wesley Write permis-
sion. In the Jack task, both failing to explicitly deny Jack
Write permission (omitting Subgoal 2 in Figure 3) and fail-
ing to explicitly deny Jack Administrate permission (omit-
ting Subgoal 3 in Figure 3) were goal errors.
There are numerous other frameworks that could be used
to classify human error. THEA was chosen because it was
specifically designed for evaluating user interfaces and be-
cause of its grounding in the familiar work of Norman [14].
Wesley task Jack task
XPFP 58% 25%
Salmon 83% 100%
Table 1: Accuracy rates for Jack and Wesley tasks on XPFP
and Salmon interfaces
7 Results and discussion
7.1 XPFP interface
Table 1 shows the percentage of participants who suc-
cessfully completed the Wesley and Jack tasks on the XPFP
and Salmon interfaces. Of the 12 participants who per-
formed the Wesley and Jack tasks using the XPFP inter-
face, 7 (58%) successfully completed the Wesley task and
3 (25%) successfully completed the Jack task. While ac-
curacy requirements for a file-permissions-setting interface
may vary depending on security needs, it is hard to imag-
ine an environment in which 58% and 25% accuracy rates
(and hence 42% and 75% chances of leaving vulnerabili-
ties) would be acceptable.
The error analysis of the XPFP study revealed a prepon-
derance of goal errors. Of 9 total errors identified in the
Wesley task, 5 were goal errors (see Table 2). Of 16 total
errors identified in the Jack task, 15 were goal errors (see
Table 3). Moreover, all catastrophic errors, i.e., those that
directly caused task failure, were goal errors, and all goal
errors were catastrophic.
The preponderance of goal errors observed in XPFP is
not surprising. As noted above in section 3, the XPFP inter-
face lacks vital pieces of information to the file-permissions
problem solver (see Figure 1). In the main XPFP window,
there is no display of group membership, no indication of
the existence of Administrate permissions, and no display
of effective permissions. Without effective permissions,
progress toward the root goal cannot be accurately checked.
Many users, unaware of the distinction between stated and
effective permissions, used the stated permissions to deter-
mine whether the root goal had been completed. For exam-
ple, many users saw the XPFP window in the state shown in
Figure 1. From this display, it appeared to many users that
Wesley was allowed Read permission because his “Allow
Read” checkbox is checked, but not allowed Write permis-
sion, because his “Allow Write” checkbox is not checked.
They did not realize that he has effective allow Write per-
mission from ProjectF. Users hence were misled into think-
ing they had completed the task when they had not.
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Goal Plan Action Perception
catas-
trophic
non-
catas-
trophic
catas-
trophic
non-
catas-
trophic
catas-
trophic
non-
catas-
trophic
catas-
trophic
non-
catas-
trophic
XPFP 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
Salmon 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0
Table 2: Count of errors by type for Wesley task on XPFP and Salmon interfaces. The four error types, goal, plan, action,
and perception, are drawn from THEA [15]. Catastrophic errors are those that caused task failure.
Goal Plan Action Perception
catas-
trophic
non-
catas-
trophic
catas-
trophic
non-
catas-
trophic
catas-
trophic
non-
catas-
trophic
catas-
trophic
non-
catas-
trophic
XPFP 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Salmon 0 1 0 3 0 2 0 0
Table 3: Count of errors by type for Jack task on XPFP and Salmon interfaces. The four error types, goal, plan, action, and
perception, are drawn from THEA [15]. Catastrophic errors are those that caused task failure.
7.2 Salmon interface
Of the 12 participants who performed the Wesley and
Jack tasks using the Salmon interface, 10 (83%) success-
fully completed the Wesley task and 12 (100%) successfully
completed the Jack task (see Table 1). Salmon’s success rate
for the Wesley task represented a 43% improvement over
XPFP’s success rate. Salmon’s success rate for the Jack
task represented a 300% improvement over XPFP’s success
rate. Since the Jack task is the harder task, it is surprising to
see a lower success rate for Wesley on the Salmon interface
(83% compared to 100% for Jack). Since this lower success
rate is only based on two failures, however, it may be due to
random variation - the failures could as easily have occurred
on the Jack task. Nonetheless, Salmon’s improvement over
the XPFP success rates is evident.
The error analysis of the Salmon study revealed a sub-
stantial reduction in the number of goal errors compared to
the XPFP study. Of 4 total errors identified in the Salmon
study for the Wesley task, one was a catastrophic goal error,
compared with 9 total errors in the XPFP study of which
5 were catastrophic goal errors (see Table 2). This repre-
sents an 80% reduction in goal errors per participant from
the XPFP study for the Wesley task. Of 6 total errors iden-
tified in the Salmon study for the Jack task, one was a non-
catastrophic goal error, compared with 16 total errors in the
XPFP study of which 15 were catastrophic goal errors (see
Table 3). This represents a 94% reduction in goal errors per
participant from the XPFP study for the Jack task.
The improvement in task-completion successes and the
dramatic reduction in goal errors achieved in the Salmon
study can be accounted for primarily by the use of anchor-
based subgoaling in the design of the Salmon interface.
Users of Salmon were able to track progress and identify
the subgoals necessary to complete tasks using the effective
permissions display. Although Salmon’s design contains
numerous superficial changes from the XPFP design (such
as different fonts, labels, icons, colors, and layout), observa-
tion of participants’ protocols strongly suggested that it was
the effective permissions display that led users to formu-
late the correct goals. For example, one Salmon participant,
about to commit an incorrect solution to the Jack task, said,
“I see Jack over here [pointing to Jack’s stated permissions]
now, and he doesn’t have any access rights... Oh, wait! Jack
has access rights over here [pointing to Salmon’s effective
permissions display].” After noticing the effective permis-
sions display, the participant was able to correctly complete
the task. In contrast, one typical XPFP participant, look-
ing at Wesley’s stated permissions in the XPFP window as
shown in Figure 1, said, “And apparently his permissions
are just Read. That’s what we want.” He had not explic-
itly denied Write permission to Wesley, and committed his
incorrect solution. In the absence of correct information
to confirm that the task was complete, the participant used
incorrect information, the stated permissions, to “confirm”
that he had correctly completed the task.
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8 Conclusion
In the course of completing tasks with a user interface,
users look for information to formulate goals and to check
progress. When the necessary information is misleading or
absent, users fail to establish the correct goals and hence
make goal errors. Goal errors may lead to total task fail-
ure, and thus impinge on interface dependability. Many
goal errors can be prevented by providing a complete and
correct representation of the completion status of the user’s
root goal. The design principle which calls for such a rep-
resentation has been named anchor-based subgoaling.
The Windows XP file permissions interface, which does
not use anchor-based subgoaling, was shown to have unac-
ceptably low success rates, 58% and 25%, on two represen-
tative file-permissions-setting tasks. Salmon, an alternative
interface designed in accordance with the anchor-based sub-
goaling principle, was shown to increase percentage of suc-
cesses to 83% and 100% on the same tasks. Furthermore,
user tests with Salmon showed a dramatic reduction in the
occurrence of goal errors compared to XPFP, with 80%
fewer goal errors on one task and 94% fewer goal errors
on the other. These substantial improvements in success-
ful task completion and reductions in goal error occurrence
were due primarily to anchor-based subgoaling. These suc-
cess rates far more closely approach what is needed for
dependable user interfaces in mission-critical systems like
those required for setting security-related configurations.
9 Future work
Anchor-based subgoaling has been demonstrated to be a
successful design technique for reducing goal errors in the
domain of file-permissions setting, but the technique will
need to be tested in other task domains before it is fully
proven. Testing in additional task domains will also help
define its limits, and potentially reveal areas in which it can-
not by itself reduce goal errors.
The present work attempted only to reduce one type of
user interface error, goal errors. Future work will look at
means to reduce plan, action, and perception errors.
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